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Abstract. Markets for transport are often characterised by unequal demand in both directions:
every morning during peak hours the trains are crowded while moving towards the direction
of large cities, whereas they may be almost empty in the other direction. In this paper we
discuss the implications of these imbalances for price setting of transport firms. From the
viewpoint of economic theory, two regimes can be distinguished: one where – owing to price
discrimination – the flows are equal, and one where unequal flows are the result. Special
attention is paid to the case where the transport firm does not apply price discrimination, as is
the case with most railway firms in Europe. We find that in the case of substantial joint costs,
the introduction of price discrimination not only leads to an increase of profits, but also to positive
effects on consumer surplus. This result differs from the standard result in the literature on
industrial economics. The standard result purports that with linear demand functions price dis-
crimination has a negative impact on the welfare of the average consumer and that this negative
impact dominates the positive effect on profits of the producer. 
1.  Introduction
Multiproduct firms often benefit from the fact that the production of several
different goods in one firm is cheaper than outputs produced by separate mono-
product firms. A special example of multiproduct firms are transport
companies: a transport company serving a certain market between points A
and B will also produce services between B and A when the vehicles make
the return journey. The structure of transport cost is such that once the capacity
costs of the AB trip have been made, the additional costs of transporting
passengers in the opposite direction are relatively small. An interesting feature
of transport markets is that demand in both directions may be rather unbal-
anced. This holds true for both freight and passenger transport. This imbalance
is one of the reasons why load factors in transport are often so low. In this
paper we address the question to what extent differentiated prices can help
to overcome this problem and explore the (possible) welfare implications.
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To give an illustration of the magnitude of the problem we present data
on a small sample of public transport links in the Netherlands during the
morning peak (see Table 1.1).1 Substantial differences in the number of pas-
sengers in both directions can be observed. These differences are especially
large for bus transport (up to a factor of 20). An explanation of the differ-
ence between bus and train is the large share of school children travelling
by bus from villages to cities where most of the schools for secondary edu-
cation are located. Public transport operators can apply several strategies to
accommodate this imbalance such as waiting until the afternoon peak for the
return trip of some of the vehicles or using some of the vehicles on other
links between the morning and the afternoon peak. In this paper we discuss
the strategy of differentiated price setting to cope with the lack of balance.
In the economic literature various terms have been used for the phenom-
enon that production of one type of output implies that also other types of
outputs are produced; for example; joint products, joint costs or cost inter-
dependence (Gravelle & Rees 1992; Tirole 1988). The joint cost phenomenon
is obviously related to the notion of economies of scope. A joint cost function
is said to exhibit economies of scope when the costs of producing given
amounts of two different outputs q1 and q2 are lower when it is done in an inte-
grated firm compared with when it is done by two specialist firms, one
producing only q1 and the other one only q2. In the context of the back-haul
problem this condition is obviously satisfied.2
In the transport literature the joint cost phenomenon is known as the back
haul problem (Felton 1981). The problem has received substantial attention
in the older transport economics literature. See for example Locklin (1947),
Ferguson (1972), Mohring (1976) and Felton (1981). The older literature on
the back haul problem strongly focuses on freight transport in regulated
markets. For example, in the USA, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
had formulated rules for the rates to be charged in interstate trucking. These
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Table 1.1. Number of daily public transport passengers in the Netherlands during the peak
(weekdays) in both directions for a small sample of independent links.
Link Mode Number of passengers Number of passengers
(high volume direction) (low volume direction)
AB Bus 0,391 0,016
CD Bus 0,200 0,022
EF Bus 1,595 0,083
GH Train 8,954 2,986
IJ Train 1,695 1,255
KL Train 0,756 0,461
Source: NSR (train data), ZWN (bus data).
rules gave little scope for lower rates on transport markets characterised by
spatial imbalances and therefore imply a shift of costs from shippers in one
direction to shippers in the other direction. In addition the rate fixing rules
had the effect of protecting small carriers against competition by large carriers
and of giving carriers a stronger position against shippers (Felton 1981).
Indeed, Locklin (1947) who mainly defends the protection oriented ICC rules
cites the popular wisdom that “one man’s back haul is another man’s living.”
Similar policies of rate regulation are mentioned by Locklin for railways and
aviation, both relating to freight transport.
In the more recent literature the back haul problem usually only receives
brief attention (see for example Korver et al. 1992; Button 1993 and Blauwens
et al. 1995). A possible explanation is that the practices of rate regulation
have changed considerably during the past decades so that transport firms
do not face such fare restrictions now. Nevertheless, the back haul problem
in unbalanced markets still deserves attention in the analysis of transport firms.
For example, it is one of the causes of the low load factors often observed
in transport. The setting of direction-dependent rates is one of the means to
improve them.
The older literature on the back haul problem usually takes the case of
perfect competition as a bench-mark (see for example Felton 1981). However,
also the case of monopolistic price setting deserves attention in this context.
The reason is that the worldwide process of deregulation of transport did not
lead to the disappearance of monopolists. There are many segments (specific
links, specific periods) in the transport market where there are still monopo-
lists. Also the practice of granting public transport suppliers long run
concessions for the exploitation of certain networks has led to the emergence
of firms with monopoly power given the duration of the concession.
In the context of monopolistic supply of transport services the back haul
problem deserves special attention. Making transport rates direction-dependent
has positive effects on total welfare in the context of perfect competition (as
demonstrated by Felton 1981). In the case of monopolistic price setting such
a beneficial effect may be questionable, however. The reason is that making
prices direction-dependent is a form of price discrimination. Since price
discrimination entails a shift of welfare from the traveller to the supplier
with a usually negative effect on total welfare, one might argue against the
use of direction dependent rates. Thus, a policy that is welfare enhacing with
perfect competition might be counter productive with a monopolist. 
The objective of this paper is to clarify this issue of the potential welfare
effects of direction dependent prices for the monopoly case. The emphasis
in the paper will be on analytical aspects. To clarify the model results, a
numerical illustration will be presented. The paper starts with a micro-economic
analysis of profit maximisation by a monopolist serving unbalanced markets
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(Section 2). Based on this we will investigate two regimes: an equal quantity
regime (where despite non-identical demand functions, one arrives at equal
quantities transported) and an unequal quantity regime. In Section 3 we will
investigate the consequences of a price setting strategy where the supplier
adopts the constraint that prices are equal in both directions. Such a price
setting strategy is typical in public transport firms in many countries. In
Section 4 some numerical examples will be given for the case of the
Netherlands Railways. Special attention will be given to the welfare effects
of the price equality constraint: it certainly reduces profits of the monopo-
list, but what is its effect on consumer surplus of travellers in both directions
and how does it affect total welfare?
2.  Price setting in the presence of joint costs
This section gives the analytical formulation of a micro-economic model of
a monopolist facing the back haul problem. Two possible regimes of outcomes
will be discussed: one where the quantities consumed in both markets are equal
and one where they are not equal. Factors having an impact on which of the
two regimes will emerge are discussed. The analysis is followed by a broader
discussion of the implications of congestion in the busy market on price setting.
Base model
Consider the case of a monopolist serving two markets (AB and BA) and
having part of the production costs dependent on the maximum quantity sold
in one of the two markets. For reasons of convenience demand on both markets
is assumed to be independent. Thus we do not go into issues of the demand
for return trips. This may seem more restrictive than it really is since the
labelling of markets AB and BA as busy and non-busy during the morning
peak simply carries over to the opposite labels during the afternoon peak. If
all AB travelers during the morning peak would return as BA travellers during
the afternoon peak (and the same pattern applies to the other travelers) this
would keep the analysis completely intact. Of course, when part of the AB
travelers during the morning peak would return outside the afternoon peak
there would be a need to introduce interdependencies between demand on both
markets. Given the aim of the paper to analyse the basic welfare effects of
direction dependent prices we have decided to avoid the introduction of inter-
dependent demand on the markets. In Section 3 more will be said about the
nature of demand at both markets. The profit function of the monopolist can
be expressed as:3
 
Π = pABqAB(pAB) + pBAqBA(pBA) + C(Q) + c(qAB) + c(qBA) (2.1)
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where p are prices, q(.) are demand functions, C(.) and c(.) are cost func-
tions with standard properties. Furthermore:
Q ≥ qAB
Q ≥ qBA (2.2)
If the monopolist can price-discriminate between the two markets, optimal
prices would be determined on the basis of the following first-order condi-
tions:
C′(Q) = λAB + λBA (2.3b)
λAB(Q – qAB) = 0    λAB ≥ 0    Q – qAB ≥ 0
λBA(Q – qBA) = 0    λBA ≥ 0    Q – qBA ≥ 0 (2.3c)
Conditions (2.3a) are standard rules setting the price on the basis of a mark-
up over marginal costs, where the mark-up is determined by the price elasticity
of the demand in each market (ε). Here, however, marginal costs are given
by two components: “direct” marginal costs c′(.) and a Lagrange multiplier.
From (2.3b) it can be seen that at least one of the two multipliers must be
positive, which means that at least in one market the quantity q is equal
to Q.
When only one multiplier is positive, marginal common costs C′(Q) are
completely assigned to the larger market, and the supplier acts as if it were
in two separate markets in which marginal costs are higher in the larger market.
A more interesting case emerges when quantities q are equal (and equal
to Q). Common costs are then shared, the multipliers are both positive and
they are set in order to satisfy (2.3a). Clearly, nothing ensures that the
multipliers expressing the share of common marginal costs allocated to the two
markets are equal. This may be interpreted as a sort of cross-subsidisation
between the two markets.
Thus the analysis indicates that two possible regimes may emerge. In the
first regime the quantities consumed in both markets are unequal (UQ).
Apparently the gap between demand in the two markets is so large that it cannot
be closed by differentiated prices. In the second regime where equal quanti-
ties are consumed (EQ) price policies appear to be effective to get rid of the
empty vehicle problem.
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( )pAB = 1 – 1εAB –1 [c′(qAB) + λAB]
( )pBA = 1 – 1εBA –1 [c′(qBA) + λBA]
(2.3a)
Graphical illustration
To better understand how a regime of equal quantities (EQ) may emerge
from an unconstrained profit maximisation with joint costs, it may be useful
to think about the problem of price setting as being composed of two stages:
first, for each level of total quantity produced, the production is efficiently
allocated in the two markets and, second, the optimal activity level is deter-
mined.
The first stage can be easily studied by means of isocost-isorevenue
diagrams. An isocost function includes all the pairs (qAB, qBA) associated with
the same level of total production costs. Analogously, an isorevenue curve
identifies all the pairs associated with the same revenue level. Examples of
isocost and isorevenue functions are depicted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.
Isocost curves appear to be kinked here because of the presence of common
costs, and in this case the kink is found where the quantities are equal. Higher
common costs, relative to direct marginal costs, make isocost functions “more
kinked”.
Isorevenue functions are instead concentric circles with inner circles
associated with higher revenue levels. The centre of the concentric curves is
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Figure 2.2. Isorevenue curves.
Figure 2.1. Isocost curves.
situated on the quantity pair that would be chosen in the absence of produc-
tion costs.
It is straightforward to see that a necessary condition for profit maximisa-
tion is given by the tangency between an isorevenue and an isocost curve.4 The
set of all tangency points therefore defines an “optimal expansion path”, a
one-dimensional space along which total profits vary.5 Since the profit max-
imising quantity pair is a point on the expansion path, the two possible
outcomes of profit maximisation, equal (EQ) or unequal (UQ) quantities,
appear as shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
One might wonder whether similar results would be obtained in the case
of a price-taking transport company. This case has been studied by Felton
(1981). He demonstrates that also in the competitive case differentiated prices
will be found, and that again two regimes (EQ and UQ) can be distinguished.
The difference is of course that in our case the monopolist applies a mark
up on the marginal costs, whereas such a mark up is not possible in the com-
petitive case.
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Figure 2.4. UQ case.
Figure 2.3. EQ case.
Comparison of EQ and UQ regime
One may wonder which factors determine whether the EQ regime will appear
as opposed to the UQ regime. By looking at the two diagrams, it is immedi-
ately verifiable that the following conditions make the emergence of an EQ
solution more likely:
a) relatively higher common costs, shifting the kink point above and right-
ward. A special example is given by the absence of direct marginal costs
c(.), where isocost curves would be “squared”;
b) market sizes relatively equal, where market size is defined as the maximum
quantity associated with positive marginal revenue. Similar markets have
the centre of isorevenue functions close to the line qAB = qBA;
c) relatively high price elasticity in one or both markets. High elasticities
flatten the part of the isorevenue circle where the tangency point can be
found. In the limit case of exogenously fixed prices, isorevenue functions
would become downward sloping parallel lines.
The latter point suggests that it is straightforward to extend the analysis to non-
monopolistic market structures. The demand function adopted in (2.1) could
be re-interpreted as an individual demand function encountered by each com-
petitor, on the basis of its conjectures about the competitors’ behaviour. For
example, in an oligopolistic market “à la Cournot”, production volumes chosen
by concurrent firms are taken as given, so that the individual demand curve
is the residual of the market demand when the quantity produced by the com-
peting firms is subtracted.
It is interesting to note that, in a monopolistic competition model, the
price elasticity of the individual demand functions would be affected by the
entry of new competitors. Since entry increases demand elasticity in a market
for non-perfect substitute goods or services, market deregulation and increased
competition may bring about the choice of an EQ price strategy.
Implications of congestion
In the analysis given above we did not pay explicit attention to the existence
of congestion externalities in transport; yet, congestion may be quite relevant
in an analysis of a “busy” versus a “non-busy” direction. Two types of con-
gestion can be distinguished in this respect: external versus internal. In the first
case congestion occurs in a competing mode (say road transport) implying a
partial shift towards the public transport mode considered here. This would
already be absorbed in the parameters of the demand function qAB(pAB) for
public transport: the high level of demand for public transport in the busy
direction may be partly due to travellers who want to avoid road congestion.
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In the case of “internal” congestion the speed and/or comfort in the busy
direction may be adversely affected by the number of travellers. When this
leads to higher costs of producing the transport services this will be reflected
by the pertaining cost function c(qAB) which has the property of decreasing
returns to scale. The analysis of Section 2 allows for such cost functions. 
Internal congestion may also have an impact on the travellers, however.
Slow or crowded public transport will discourage potential users during busy
periods. To take this into account the demand function qAB(pAB) would have
to be generalised so that it incorporates indicators of travel time tAB and comfort
vAB (for example, the probability of getting a seat), which are themselves
functions of travel demand qAB. Note that the present formulation of the demand
function qAB = qAB(pAB) can be considered as a rewritten form of qAB =
f[pAB, tAB(qAB), vAB(qAB)] so that congestion has been incorporated in an implicit
way. Obviously, when the number of travellers has an impact on travel time
and comfort this would have a dampening effect on demand in the busy
direction. Given the externality involved, profit maximising public transport
operators would apply an upward shift of the price in the busy direction to
let the travellers pay for the external costs imposed on other travellers, similar
to the case of congestion pricing on roads.
We conclude that the various forms of congestion considered here all tend
to lead to a higher price set in the busy direction: 
– congestion on the road makes public transport demand less price elastic
(because the competing mode is less attractive) so that there are more oppor-
tunities for a mark-up (see 2.3a);
– introduction of congestion leads to higher marginal costs c′(qAB) implying
higher prices (see 2.3a);
– crowding and travel time losses among travellers induce congestion pricing
strategies such that travellers in the busy direction pay a congestion charge
to cover the disutility imposed on other travellers.
3.  Discriminatory vs. uniform pricing: a welfare analysis
In this section the welfare implications of direction-dependent pricing will
be discussed. Three types of actors will be distinguished for this purpose:
people travelling from A to B, people travelling from B to A, and the public
transport supplier. As a benchmark we will use the case where the monopo-
list imposes a uniform price on both markets.
The analysis conducted thus far has made clear that a network operator,
if it is free to set prices in order to maximise profits, would not – in general
– choose equal prices for two markets linked by cost interdependence. Yet,
405
several examples can be found, especially in transportation markets, where
prices are made dependent on distance but not on the direction, so that the
same price applies to different markets. In this section, we shall consider the
implications in terms of variations in profits and welfare of discriminatory
(differentiated) and uniform pricing. To this end, we shall continue to assume
that firms set prices according to profit maximisation, even in the presence
of a constraint of price equalisation.
First of all, it is apparent that profits cannot increase if prices must be
equalised. If a firm is free to set different prices, it can “at worst” replicate
the outcome obtained under uniform pricing. Mathematically, a constrained
maximisation cannot lead to better results than an unconstrained one.
Level of uniform price
On the other hand, the welfare of consumers in the two markets is affected
by the direction of price changes. In this respect, it can be demonstrated
under fairly general assumptions about demand and cost functions6 that the
single price, which would be chosen for both markets, must lie between the
two prices chosen under discrimination.
To see this, consider the example of Figure 3.1, in which profit functions
for the two markets are depicted in terms of price. The two functions are drawn
under the assumption that common costs are considered as the production costs
of the largest market.
We start with a discussion of the level of the uniform price in the UQ regime.
If prices are allowed to differ and it is not optimal to sell equal quantities,
prices are chosen to achieve, independently, the maximum profit in the two
markets. If, instead, a uniform price has to be set, the firm maximises the
sum of the two profit functions. By recalling that total profits are increasing
(decreasing) where both profit functions are increasing (decreasing),7 it is clear
that the optimal uniform price can neither be found in regions X and X′ nor
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Figure 3.1. Profit functions in the two markets.
in regions Y and Y′. The price must therefore lie between the two differenti-
ated prices. In turn, welfare of consumers in the large market increases
with a single price, whereas consumers in the small market are made worse
off.
Since the price in the small market tends to increase, it is also possible
that the price would be too high to have a positive demand there. In this
case, the small market would “disappear”. In the large market the price and
the consumer surplus would remain unchanged. In other words, price dis-
crimination would lead to a Pareto improvement with gains for both the firm
and the remaining consumers.
We continue with the EQ regime. When prices are set in the two markets
so as to equalise the quantity sold, from (2.3) it can be noted that the marginal
profit in the small market is positive in the optimum, whereas it is negative
for the large market.8 Prices are then set lower in the small market and higher
in the large market, in comparison with the UQ case (thus the optimal price
in the large market will be in the Y′ zone; in the small market it will be in
the X′ zone). The argument applied above can be used here as well, so that
the optimal uniform price can neither be found in region X nor in region Y.
A difference with the UQ regime emerges when the small market is not
served under uniform pricing, because there would be no more need to equalise
quantities, and this would make the price in the large market somewhat lower.
Again we have here losses for consumers in the small market and gains for
those in the large market, but with a different causal mechanism.
Welfare implications; who looses and who benefits
Who are the winners and loosers with the introduction of uniform pricing in
unbalanced transport markets? First of all it is clear that the supplier is among
the loosers: the price equality constraint implies a reduction in profits. Second.
it appears that the consumers in the small market will also be loosers because
they will have to pay a higher price. The reverse holds true for the con-
sumers in the large market.
For an overall welfare assessment one would need to add the welfare and
profit changes of the various actors. To make this a feasible exercise we have
to make a number of simplifying assumptions. Therefore we consider a special
case where demand functions are linear, there are no direct marginal costs,9
and marginal common costs C are constant:
qAB = A – BpAB
qBA = a – bpBA
C(qAB) = CqAB (3.1)
A > a A/B = a/b
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It can be easily verified that optimal discriminatory and uniform prices are here
determined as the following:10
Furthermore, because demand functions are linear and there are constant returns
to scale, it can be checked that the total quantity qAB + qBA is the same under
the two price regimes (Robinson 1933). This has important implications in
terms of welfare. If the total quantity to be allocated is a given, the maximum
total consumers’ utility is achieved when the marginal utilities are equal. But
in turn each consumer equates its marginal utility to the ratio of the price
and the marginal utility of income; if the latter is not too different among
the consumers,11 the imposition of a single price means that welfare gains in
the large market always exceed welfare losses in the small market, if the
small market continues to be served.
Since profits are higher under discriminatory pricing, the variation in profits
caused by the imposition of a uniform price is unambiguously negative:
Looking at (3.3), it is interesting to notice that:
– profit losses are higher the larger the difference in the size of the markets,
expressed in terms of maximum willingness to pay, or in terms of maximum
quantity. This is intuitively clear, as there should be more scope for setting
different prices when the basic conditions are different;
– profit losses are higher the larger the common cost component C. In the
case of a UQ discrimination, common costs are considered as production
costs of the large market: their inclusion amplifies the asymmetry of the two
markets. When an EQ solution emerges, there is an incentive to differen-
tiate the prices even more to achieve the equalisation of quantities. 
By charging discriminatory prices, the quantity sold in the large market
decreases, making it possible to save on production costs. This “cost saving
effect” is important because it overlaps with the fundamental motivation of
price discrimination: the extraction of consumer surplus by the monopolist. 
Consequently, there are two separate reasons why price discrimination is
profitable for a monopolist. The standard case is that with different price
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pAB =
A + BC
2B
(A + a) + BC
2(B + b)
;    pBA =
a
2b

p =
(3.2)
∆Π = – (Ab – aB + bBC)
2
4bB(b + B) (3.3)
elasticities, price discrimination serves to exploit a larger part of the consumer
surplus. In addition, with joint costs, price discrimination helps to avoid high
costs for the production on the large AB market. 
What are the implications for total surplus, defined as the sum of profit
and consumer surplus? The standard result has been formulated by Tirole
(1988): with linear demand functions price discrimination is bad for total
surplus as long as both markets are served. The introduction of joint costs
makes the expression of variations in total surplus quite complex and diffi-
cult to analyse in general terms. However, following Tirole (1988), it is possible
to compute lower and upper bounds for this variation. These are:
Observe that if C = 0, total surplus would increase if a uniform price is
imposed. This means that, if common costs are not very large, the gains for
the consumers in the large market can compensate for the losses in profits
for the firm and in surplus for the consumers of the small market. However,
if C is sufficiently high, the “cost saving effect” may dominate, bringing
about losses in profits so large that the variation in total surplus becomes
negative. This can be seen in (3.4) because increases in C reduce both the lower
and upper bounds. We conclude that the introduction of a uniform price in
stead of price discrimination has two opposing effects on total surplus. Against
the beneficial effect that monopolistic price discrimination is removed there
is the adverse effect that potential cost savings of avoiding empty vehicles
are not realised. Which of the two effects will dominate depends on the actual
values of the parameters. 
Thus, the welfare effects of uniform prices with a profit maximising monop-
olist cannot a priori be spelled out to be positive or negative. In the case of
a price taking firm such an effect would be unambigously positive (see Felton
1981) since the adverse welfare effects of price discrimination would not
apply. 
4.  Numerical illustration: the Dutch railways
Given the indecisive result of our analysis that the welfare effect of uniform
pricing on total surplus may be both negative and positive, a numerical illus-
tration will be helpful to assess the size of the two countervailing forces.
Railways are a good example of suppliers facing joint costs leading to the back
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(Ab – aB)2 – (bBC)2
4bB(b + B)
–C∆qAB ≤ ∆W ≤ (pAB – C)∆qAB + pBA∆qBA
–
C[(Ab – aB) + bBC
2(b + B) ≤ ∆W ≤
(3.4)
haul problem. In this section we will give a short illustration of the conse-
quences of joint costs on price setting for the Netherlands. 
One may wonder to what extent it is appropriate to model the Dutch national
railway company as a monopoly. A first point is that there is competition
between public transport and the car. A more complete formulation of the
demand functions would indeed indicate that the price of the competing mode
(car) would be incorporated. However, one may consider the price of car use
as exogenous in our model – there is no risk that some agent would adjust
the price of car use as a consequence of price policies of the railway company
– so that competition between car and railways can be safely ignored. A second
question is to what extent competition on the Dutch railway tracks has to be
considered. The Dutch railway system has been in a period of transition from
a national state controlled company towards a system where some form of
competition may be allowed. During a couple of years there has been a
second supplier of services on the Dutch railways (Lovers Rail) versus the
incumbent Netherlands Railways (NSR), but services provided by Lovers
Rail were very insignificant in size and consumer response has been disap-
pointing (a market share of less than 0.1%), so that Lovers Rail has decided
to terminate its services in 1999. In the meantime the national government
is changing its policy from stimulating competition towards franchising of
regional networks based on competitive bidding. On the intercity network
(the link AB analysed in the empirical case study being part of it) competi-
tion is not allowed according to the current rules. In a legal sense NSR is
free to set its prices in order to maximise profits but it has been reluctant to
do so because the Dutch public still considers NSR as a public company.
For example, changes in the system of annual travel cards have led to a
strong negative response in public discussions. The empirical study given
here serves as an investigation of the consequences a profit-oriented differ-
entiation of prices would have.
Base case with direction dependent prices
We take as an example the link between two medium sized cities (A and
B),12 where in the current situation of direction-independent prices in the
morning peak, the daily number of travellers in one direction is about 35%
higher than in the other direction.
The linearised demand equations for both directions are:
qAB = 2460 – 60pAB,
qBA = 1820 – 44pBA
where monetary units are in dfl. The difference in scale in both markets is
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reflected by the difference in the constants in this demand function. The highest
willingness to pay equals about dfl 41 in both markets (2460/60 and 1820/44).
It is a coincidence that this value is equal for both markets. An implication
is that for a given price, the price elasticity of demand is equal in both markets.
The cost function for the service between A and B and vice versa is assumed
to be linear; the parameters have been estimated to be:
C = (0.86)(qAB + qBA) + (9.69)[max(qAB, qBA)] + fixed costs.
The cost factor 0.86 is the marginal cost of a passenger when we assume
that there is sufficient capacity; this cost relates to passenger dependent services
(such as ticket windows, train guards, etc.). The cost factor of 9.69 relates
to the costs of moving seats (regardless of whether they are occupied or empty),
plus the cost for the national railways of owning seats; it is assumed that
additional seats are only used during the peak and that they do not generate
receipts during the rest of the day.
Profit maximisation without imposing a price equality constraint leads to
an optimum as follows:
pAB = 25.78, qAB = 913.2
pBA = 21.11, qBA = 891.2.
Note that the marginal cost in market BA is very low, so that the price is
near the price level where marginal returns are zero (p = 20.5). The price
paid by travellers in the low demand direction is only based on the marginal
cost of 0.86 per passenger; the capacity costs are completely taken into account
in the price charged to the passengers travelling in the opposite direction.
The price differentiation clearly leads to a substantial convergence of volumes
of travellers in both directions compared with the current situation. Actually,
the optimum found in this case is quite close to the equal quantity regime
discussed in Sections 2 and 3.
Price setting under the price equality constraint
Profit maximisation under the price equality constraint would result in: 
p = 23.80,   qAB = 1032,   qBA = 772.6. 
Under this constraint the difference in the number of travellers in both direc-
tions is substantial.13
What are the welfare consequences of the introduction of the equal price?
For AB travellers welfare (measured by means of consumer surplus) increases
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owing to the price decrease (+1945). For BA travellers the opposite occurs:
(–2246). Thus, the average consumer loses when the monopolist uses the
self-imposed constraint that prices are equal in both directions. In addition, the
profits of the railway company would decrease by an amount of 548. Thus,
the change in total surplus when the price equality constraint is imposed is
–849, the distribution being such that the firm and BA travellers are nega-
tively affected and AB travellers are positively affected. This case underlines
the importance of joint costs in the welfare analysis. Without joint costs the
introduction of a uniform price would have a positive effect on total surplus
(see Section 3).14 But here the opposite is found: strong cost interdependence
calls for differentiated prices from a social welfare perspective, even in the
context of monopolistic price setting practices.
Sensitivity analysis
Of course this result depends on the specific parameters of demand and cost
functions. Below we show the results of two other cases using different sets
of parameters. In case 1 a rather large difference exists between the AB and
the BA market, both in terms of size of market and willingness to pay. The
cost function remains unaltered:
qAB = 2000 – 50pAB,
qBA = 600 – 20pBA
C = (0.86)(qAB + qBA) + (9.69)[max(qAB, qBA)] + fixed costs.
The results can be found in Table 4.1. A large difference in the number of
passengers in both directions is observed. The quantity difference is substan-
tially larger when the price equality constraint is imposed; this would lead
to considerable positive welfare effects in market AB. The welfare loss of
passengers in the other direction is smaller, therefore the average consumer
benefits from the self-imposed price equality constraint. However, the sum
of changes in consumer surpluses and profits is negative, since it appears
that the advantage for the average consumer does not outweigh the decrease
in profits for the supplier. When we compare the outcome of case 1 with
that of the base case, we note that in both cases the introduction of a uniform
price has a negative effect on profits, consumer surplus of travelers in the small
market and on total surplus. The consumers in the busy market benefit in
both cases. A difference between the two cases is that the average consumer
benefits in the base case, whereas he loses in case 1.
In case 2 we use the same demand functions but drop the cost interde-
pendence by using the cost function:
C = (0.86)(qAB + qBA) + fixed costs.
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In this case the imposition of the price equality constraint means that the
benefits for the passengers in the large market exceed the disadvantages for
the small market passengers and the transport company itself. This is a well-
known result from the standard literature (see Section 3). It implies that in
the absence of cost interdependencies and with the given linear specifica-
tions, a self-imposed constraint for a monopolist (which by definition leads
to lower profits), leads to benefits for consumers that outweigh the profit
decrease. 
We conclude that the outcome of the welfare analysis strongly depends
on the size of the cost interdependence. When the interdependence is low,
the imposition of the price equality constraint leads to a smaller decrease in
costs for the monopolist, compared with the case where the price interde-
pendence is high. The reason is that price equality induces larger differences
in flows in both directions which has a consequent strong cost impact via
the cost interdependence term c.[max(qAB, qBA)] when parameter c is large.
Since in the case of transport firms the cost interdependence is usually sub-
stantial, we conclude that the self-imposed price equality constraint may not
be expected to have positive effects on total surplus. 
Two limitations have to be mentioned of the above analysis. First of all,
they are based on parameters from confidential sources that have not been
subjected to standard statistical tests. Therefore, the above computations only
have the aim to illustrate the theoretical viewpoints presented in Section 3
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Table 4.1. Effects of profit maximisation under the price equality constraint, with and without
cot interdependence.
Case 1: Case 2:
With joint costs Without joint costs
Unconstrained profit maximisation:
pAB 0,0024.4 0,020.4
pBA 0,0015.4 00,15.4
qAB 0,0780 0,980
qBA 0,0292 0,292
Profit maximisation with price equality constraint:
p 0,0021.8 00,18.97
qAB 0,0909.0 1,051.5
qBA 0,0163.6 0,220.6
Change in:
Consumer surplusAB 02,179 1,452
Consumer surplusBA –1,462 ,–915
Profit –1,157 ,–357
Sum: 0–440 0,180
but do not claim to be precise estimates of the effects of uniform versus
direction dependent pricing strategies. Second, no attention is paid to other
relevant aspects, one of them being the costs of complexity.15 Public trans-
port companies sometimes consider complex fare systems as a significant
deterrant to travel. Therefore they tend to prefer uniform fares. It should be
noted, however, that as electronic media become increasingly important as a
source of information on fares, complexity cost may be expected to decrease.
Thus, ICT developments tend to support the introduction of more refined
pricing structures. Note also that in related markets such as aviation trav-
elers have become used to rather complex fare structures. Also in high
speed rail services fare structures have become more complex during the
past period.
Given the positive effect of price discrimination on profits it is no surprise
that several European railway companies are considering non-uniform pricing
schemes where the prices are no longer simply based on the number of
kilometres travelled, but where prices are time and direction dependent. The
present paper demonstrates that given the issue of joint costs this price
discrimination may also be beneficial for the average consumer. It should be
emphasized that the direction dependent fare system discussed here is not
identical to the time dependent fare system used by public transport compa-
nies in various countries. Such a time dependent fare system may for example
mean that reduced fare tickets can only be used outside the peak periods.
Note however, that on many public transport lines during the peak period
vehicles are crowded in one direction but rather empty in the other (see also
Table 1.1). Hence, a real application of direction dependent fares goes one step
further since it would not only differentiate according to time of day, but
also according to direction. For example trains running into the large cities
during the morning peak would have higher fares than trains running in the
opposite direction.
5.  Concluding remarks
Joint costs in the situation of unbalanced markets pose a challenge to trans-
port firms. In this paper we have investigated the implications for price
strategies of transport firms. We find that two regimes may emerge when
cost interdependence is present: an equal quantity regime (EQ), where despite
the difference in demand in both markets, differentiated prices lead to equal
quantities, and the UQ regime, where price differences will not be able to yield
equal quantities. Thus, equal flows in opposing directions are not necessarily
a sign of balanced markets.
The following conditions make the emergence of an EQ result more likely:
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– a small difference in the dimension of both markets;
– high price elasticity in the large market;
– a high level of cost interdependence.
In many countries suppliers of transport services apply an equal price in both
markets. This obviously has welfare implications, compared with the case
that different prices are charged in different markets. The imposition of equal
prices will lead to lower profits, a higher consumer surplus in the large market,
and a lower surplus in the small market. An important question is of course
what is the net result of the three effects.
A numerical illustration using Dutch railway data shows that the net effect
of the price equality constraint on total surplus may easily be negative: for
plausible values of the parameters we find a decrease in profits that is not
off-set by an increase in the surplus of the average consumer. In the partic-
ular case considered, we even find that the loss of consumer welfare in the
small market is larger than the increase in consumer welfare in the large market.
It is clear that the above results are based on a rather stylised model of
transport markets. To bring the models formulated here closer to reality, we
could introduce richer network structures (for example, people using the AB
link in reality will travel from A to C via B). Travellers may express a dislike
for crowding and accordingly have a different willingness-to-pay. The intro-
duction of direction dependent prices implies the introduction of peak load
pricing in public transport, and hence leads to the issue of choice of period
of travel (peak versus off-peak). Other factors to be taken into account in future
research are the costs of complexity related to complex fare systems and the
disincentives these may have on total demand.
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Notes
01. Although we use abstract symbols like A and B to represent links between nodes, we want
to emphasise that they represent real data about real cities; the links are independent. The
reason we do not give the actual names is that the data concerned are confidential. Also
the demand and cost function used in Section 4 are taken from applied models currently
in use.
02. Note that there is still another form of economies of scope that is not related to joint costs:
A firm producing complementary goods may have higher profits compared with supply of
the products by separate firms, even when the costs would be independent.
415
03. We assume here that the cost function is separable and that the sub-functions related to
the two markets are equal. Both assumptions, however, are not necessary to obtain the results
illustrated in this section.
04. To see this, choose an isocost curve and find the highest revenue obtainable at the given
cost level or, vice versa, minimise costs for each level of revenue.
05. Isocost-isorevenue diagrams can also be usefully employed to illustrate cases of constrained
profit maximisation. For example, in this paper the case of uniform price setting is con-
sidered. For each single price level, the quantities sold in the two markets would then be
exogenously determined. This defines an alternative “expansion path”, along which profits
can be maximised.
06. The assumptions needed regard the quasi-concavity of profit functions in the two markets.
For example, this is ensured if demand and cost functions are both linear. We shall also
assume here that the two demand curves do not intersect, so that for each price the market
associated with the largest quantity remains the same.
07. Or, equivalently, one is increasing and the other is constant.
08. Recall that here the profit functions are computed by allocating all common costs to the large
market.
09. This restriction is irrelevant if direct marginal costs are constant, because the parameters
of the demand function can be normalised. To obtain results for the more general case,
substitute parameters A and a in (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) with A′ + Bc and a′ + bc, if c is the
direct marginal cost (possibly different in the two markets).
10. We are assuming here that parameter values are consistent with the emergence of an UQ
solution in the discriminatory regime.
11. We are not aware of systematic evidence on differing marginal utilities of income between
passengers in busy versus non-busy directions. Note that these marginal utilities may also
vary within the two groups; for example commuters and students, that are probably over-
represented in the busy direction compared with travellers in the non-busy direction may
have quite different marginal utilities of income, the latter group having a higher value
than the former group possibly leading to an average value for the busy direction that is
not far removed from the value in the opposite direction.
12. The parameters are based on confidential data provided by the Netherlands Railways
(NSR). 
13. Note that as already shown in Section 4, under the given specifications of the demand and
cost functions, the imposition of the price equality constraint does not affect the sum of
travelers in both directions.
14. As indicated in Section 3 this result holds with linear demand functions. It is contingent
on the assumption that both markets are served. Both conditions are satisfied in this example.
15. The autors thank an anonymous referee for this point.
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